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This paper describes, through a theoretical approach, the interactions between institutional lenders and local moneylenders, and how 
these affect the rural credit market. 
It evaluates the effects produced by the introduction of “spillovers” in a rural credit market with rationing in which banks and 
moneylenders interact simultaneously while working in distinct segments. Due to the strong and consolidated social ties, it is 
probable that the spread of knowledge concerning potential debtors comes about in targeted and rapid way with reduced costs for the 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine some of the principal reasons that discourage the formal 
sector from investing in rural credit markets. Various factors contribute, at different levels, to this 
situation, causing notable difficulties of access to credit  for the poorest individuals.  Initially, I  
follow the approach proposed by Basu (1997), who underlines that in the Indian rural credit market 
interpersonal ties as well as the interdependence hierarchy that is formed between  landlords and 
tenants  are among the major causes that  maintain high interest rates and that make it difficult to 
access to that market segments for traditional credit agencies. 
 
Following this, I analyse interactions between the formal sector and moneylenders in the 
Indian context, developing the theoretical model of Bell (1990) and highlighting how, through the 
introduction of the concept of “spillover” (which is tied to the spread of information  on the 
characteristics of potential borrowers in a rural context that is dominated by strong social ties, and 
supposedly, at low costs) local moneylenders enjoy a comparative advantage with respect to the 
formal sector.   3
 
THE CASE OF  THE RURAL INDIAN CREDIT MARKET 
 
We  first look at Basu’s detailed analysis of the relationships in the rural Indian credit 
market, trying to understand the reasons that  prevent the formal sector  from reaching an adequate 
level of development in this context.  
The  lenders in this market are essentially the credit institutions, local private moneylenders, 
wealthy entrepreneurs, wholesale sellers and retail merchants (the last case for small loans for 
consumption). Interest rates vary not only from region to region and according to the lending 
source, but also depend on the final use of the credit itself (for instance, for consumption or 
investment in durable goods.) 
There are two main characteristics that  distinguish these markets:   
1.  Default rates tend to be quite  low; 
2.  The level of interest rates applied in these markets is higher than that practiced by 
government-sponsored credit agencies. 
Given the empirical evidence, the question we ask is why, when default rates are relatively low, 
government credit agencies as well as other lenders such as wealthy entrepreneurs who carry out 
this activity, appear to be reluctant to extend their banking services to the poorest subjects. Now the 
point to be  addressed is why individuals  in precarious economic conditions are often refused credit 
by all of the lenders operating in the market, except for their own employers. 
The asymmetric access to the credit market by different socioeconomic groups is  closely 
connected to different guarantees that these can offer to the bank . The kind of collateral that 
potential borrowers can offer the credit agency is intrinsically and exclusively characterized by the 
acceptance of their employers, and not by other institutes of credit or lenders in general. 
In rural markets most farmers in difficult economic conditions can only offer their harvest as 
collateral, which for different reasons can undergo fluctuations (it is uncertain). In such a context it 
becomes particularly difficult to make lenders recognize collateral of this kind. 
What comes up at this point is the question of why the employer (often represented  by the 
landlord) is willing to accept part of the future harvest of the farmer (who becomes, in this context, 
the creditor as well) as collateral for a future loan, given the risk. 
Behaving in such a way the employer adopts a strategy of risk-sharing and motivates the 
farmer who practises his agricultural activity under the employer to optimize his efforts in order to 
obtain a good harvest. Between the farmer and the landlord a sort of share-cropping contract is 
made: the landlord offers lodging and necessary equipment for cultivating the fields; the farmer, on   4
the other hand, dedicates himself to farming activities and keeps a part of the harvest as retribution 
for  the labour given. A bad harvest depends on multiple factors: events not controlled by man, such 
as climatic conditions, or circumstances caused by human intervention, for instance the lack of 
proper care of the fields. 
Given that the income of the landlord is directly correlated to the performances of the 
farmer, by granting loans that are constrained to the collateral of the future harvest, he incentivates 
the farmer’s productivity and returns. This particular interdependence that is created between the 
two subjects is however asymmetric because the farmer (the weaker part) has no power and is 
hierarchically subordinated to the landlord, the wealthy owner who receives extra-economic 
benefits from this type of relationship. Many economists hold  that it is the persistence of 
monopolistic power of private lenders in rural markets  that causes high interest rates, but this 
particular asymmetric interdependence further increases the difficulties  for the poor to get credit. 
The absence of a particular relationship between the farmer and credit agencies is one of the 
major obstacles preventing the bank’s recognition of acceptable collateral. One possible solution is 
the proposal of using the landlord as “cosigner” on behalf of the farmer with credit agencies, but 
this idea  still keeps the farmer dependent on the employer and  incapable of independent economic 
evolution. In fact the landlord would continue to benefit  from economic privileges coming from 
such a hierarchical relationship. This would not allow poorer subjects to achieve a real increase of 
well-being
1. 
                                                 
1  In Basu  (1997).   5
 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE FORMAL SECTOR AND THE 
INFORMAL SECTOR IN THE RURAL INDIAN CREDIT MARKET 
 
We give here a sketchy outline of the basic assumptions that describe the interactions between 
the formal sector and local moneylenders in the rural Indian credit market,  based on Bell’s model 
(1990). Initially, we assume that: 
(1)  The informal sector operates alone on the market; 
(2) The moneylender is risk-neutral; 
(3) The moneylender’s goal is the maximization of his expected profits,  π E . 
The iso-expected profit curves will be U-shaped (as drawn in figure 1), due to the influence of 
fixed costs (for example investments of the lender in acquiring knowledge about his potential 
borrowers), and the fact that in the presence  of moral hazard, the probability of default, at some 
point, will rise with the size of the loan. 
We notice from figure 1 that there are two different cases of particular interest: First, we 
assume that there is free entry into moneylending activities, and lenders will make zero expected 
profits. In a similar context, on the basis of his information regarding the client’s characteristics, the 
lender will offer the potential debtor a menu of contracts described by the iso-expected profit curve 
() 0 , = r L Eπ . The borrower  will choose the contract (that is a combination of the variables “L” 
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. *taken from: “Interactions between institutional and informal credit agencies in rural India”, Bell (1990). 
 
The variable r , on the vertical axis, represents the rate of interest applied, while the variable 
L measures the size of loans available on the market. 
Point C  in figure 1 depicts the optimal contract, where an iso-expected net income curve
2 (for the 
borrower) is tangent to the zero expected profits curve,  ( ) 0 , = r L Eπ . 
We can observe that C  is to the left of the demand schedule for loans,  () r D
3, so that the 
client is rationed because, at the level of  interest rate which corresponds to his optimum contract, 
he would like more funds than those foreseen in the contract. If the informal sector increases the 
amount of credit available on the market, moneylenders would obtain negative expected profits.
4 
                                                 
2 See the appendix. 
3 See the appendix. 
4 As results the graph, an  increase of L ,(starting from point C , at the same rate of interest), would produce a move towards a 
lower iso-expected profits curve compared to the one that defines expected net profits equal to zero, implying negative income  for 
the lender.   7
A polar case implies that the lender is a monopolist. If there is no competition, the only 
constraint for the lender must be that the contract he offers is at least as attractive as the borrower’s 
reservation alternative  (that consists in self financing his activities), described by the curve  * V . 
If the lender is a monopolist, the contract which maximizes his expected profits is at point M , 
where the curve defined by  ()
* , V r L Ey = is tangent to the iso-expected profits curve  M Eπ . At point 
M (“take it or leave it” offer), which lies to the right of the demand curve  () r D , the level of interest 
rate applied induces the individual to decrease the size of loan requested, while the lender would 
prefer to increase the amount of the loan. 
Between these two extremes, both sides would have some contractual power and the end 
result would depend on the personal bargaining strengths . It is likely that the outcome would be 
Pareto-efficient, which means it will lie somewhere on the contract curve CM
5.  
We now  examine how the entry  of the institutional agencies into the rural market affects 
the welfare of borrowers and local moneylenders. We focus our attention only on the formal sector, 
and we also suppose that the traditional banks can offer loans up to a certain ceiling, defined by  1 L , 
at a given rate of interest  1 r . The ceiling’s size can depend on the  use to be made of the loan, the 
type and  extent of the client’s activities, and the form of collateral offered to obtain the funds. 
Given these initial assumptions, the boundary of the borrower’s opportunity set is represented by 












                                                 
5 This vertical line CM  is the contract curve (or Pareto set) that describes all the combinations of the variables L  and r  which 
produce a Pareto-efficient outcome. In this context, CM is a vertical line, as shown by Milde and Riley (1988) in a similar model, 
on the basis of the previous model of Jaffee (1972); for a demonstration, see the appendix.   8





*taken from: “Interactions between institutional and informal credit agencies in rural India”, Bell (1990). 
 




*taken from: “Interactions between institutional and informal credit agencies in rural India”, Bell (1990). 
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If an individual’s credit demand, defined by  ( ) r D , is less than  1 L , the amount of funds distributed 
will also be less; when the borrower’s credit demand exceeds or is equal to the ceiling, the sum of 
funds will be  equal to  1 L .  
In figure 2, two different graphs are shown. First, the individual’s credit demand at the rate 
of interest  1 r  is less than the ceiling; he selects point  A, where the demand curve for credit 
intersects the horizontal section of  () 0 = • ψ , and the indifference curve  () A Ey Ey = • (which defines 
all the combinations of L and r  that yield the same expected net income for the borrower) is 
tangent to  () 0 = • ψ . In the second part of figure 2, the individual’s credit demand exceeds the ration 
imposed, so that the borrower must  make to with this ration, which places him at point B , the 
“elbow” of  () 0 = • ψ . 
We now introduce the informal lender to the model, and analyse the case in which he is a 
monopolist, before the establishment of the formal sector.  
If both the moneylender and the traditional bank want to improve their performance and 
enforce their contracts, they must be able to offer a menu of contracts that are at least as attractive 
as those depicted at points  A and B  of figure 2. 
The moneylender’s optimum, because of the particular form of the borrower’s indifference 
curves,  will be the point of tangency between the iso-expected profits curve and the debtor’s 
indifference curve corresponding to the reservation alternative which is to obtain capital  from 
formal credit agencies. At point  A’  we notice that the interest rate offered by the moneylenders is 
less than  1 r  (the rate of interest applied by the formal sector). In section “b” of figure 2, the 
moneylender’s optimum is represented by point B ’, in which both the interest rate and the size of 
the loan exceed those offered by the traditional banks. 
We can go back to the case in which the moneylender is a monopolist, and suppose that the 
potential client does not enjoy the alternative opportunities offered by the institutional sector; in this 
context, the expected net income he could obtain corresponds to  * V , and the interest rate would 
rise to  * r , which exceeds  1 r  by a reasonable margin. 
At this point the arrival of the formal sector would trigger an increase of the borrower’s 
expected net income but a reduction of the expected profits for the lender; the debtor could obtain 
an advantageous loan by going to the institutional agencies. 
In figure 2.b it is evident that the traditional banks don’t hinder the operations  and the 
activities of the informal sector, if the moneylender had monopoly power in his segment of  credit 
market;  in this case, the private lenders make loans in order to assure the tangency condition 
between the iso-expected profits and the iso-expected net income for the borrower.   10
We now describe the opposite case in which there is free entry into moneylending activity, 
and the borrower does not  suffer any rationing in the institutional market. If the expected net 
income associated to the indifference curve A Ey  is higher than the one associated to  C Ey  (figure 1),  
moneylenders will leave the market, because borrowers will only go to traditional banks; in the 
opposite case (if  C Ey  exceeds  A Ey ) the formal sector will find no clients. 
If the individual is rationed in the formal credit market, the final result will depend on the 
sign of expected profits described by curve  ' B Eπ  (figure 2.b). If it is positive, local moneylenders 
will be motivated to lend on the market because the institutional lenders would not be able to offer a 
menu of contracts as attractive as  those described at point B ’; if it is negative, local moneylenders 
would be forced to leave the market. 
We now examine the case in which there are nonexclusive contracts offered by the formal 
sector; this  scenario is depicted in figure 3, differentiating between the situation in which there is 
no “spillover”
6  and the case with “spillover”. 
As shown in the following graph (figure 3.a), the lowest rate the informal lender could charge and 
still make non negative expected profits (i ) exceeds  1 r . The shape and the location of the expected 
profits curve depends on different factors: the moneylender’s knowledge of different relationships 
that regard traditional banks and borrowers, and the ease of entry into moneylending activities. 
The contours of the individual’s preference map are steeper than the previous case
7, while 
those of the local moneylenders are unchanged or become less steep, depending on the quantity and 
the quality of the information available concerning the borrower’s dealings with the formal sector. 
The most interesting case to examine is that in which the debtor is rationed in the formal 
segment of the market. In section “a” of figure 3, the indifference curve  () B Ey Ey = •  is below the 
zero profit curve  () 0 = • π E , which describes the optimal menu of contracts that the moneylender is 
able to offer. 
If the firm (in this situation, the moneylender) does not make any investment in the search of 
information concerning the borrower’s characteristics, it cannot offer any interesting contracts to 
potential clients, since there is  no contact between the two curves. 
In the two different cases depicted in figure 3.b, there is  tangency between the expected 
profits curve and the indifference curve of the borrower. The lender, in this context, invests in 
knowledge concerning the borrower’s features, and  incurs the costs  of the search of information 
needed for the screening activity. 
                                                 
6 In this particular context, I have considered the “spillovers” connected to the knowledge and information about borrowers, on the 
basis of the model developed by Romer (1986). 
7 In  Bell (1990).   11
 This increases  π E  for all levels of Land  r , which leads to a downward movement of the 
expected profits curve (as shown in the passage from part “a” to part “b” in figure 3).  
A new equilibrium, that takes on different characteristics based on the kind of market where 
moneylenders and credit agencies operate, is created. In the case of a monopoly, the equilibrium 
corresponds to point M ’, while in the presence of a competitive market it will be C ’(in which 













                                                 
8 The spread of information concerning the characteristics of potential clients to other firms (“lenders”) creates a “spillover effect”,   
that represents a positive esternality for the other operators in the market; the firm, which has initially  made the investment in 
information collection, does not receive any form of repayment for this. 
   12




*taken from: “Interactions between institutional and informal credit agencies in rural India”, Bell (1990). 
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INTERMEDIATION BETWEEN CREDIT AGENCIES AND 
MONEYLENDERS 
 
In order to evaluate the effects produced  by the intermediation  between credit agencies and 
the informal sector on the  loan contracts, initially we assume to be in a context of perfect 
information. In the absence of uncertainty, the moneylender (who either is a monopolist or operates 
in a competitive market) will  respond to a fall in the  cost of loanable funds with a  decrease in the 
level of interest rate. 
In the case of monopoly, if the moneylender  is not able to apply a perfect discrimination in 
this market,  his clients will  enjoy an improving margin; in a perfect competitive market, where the 
marginal costs are constant, the borrowers will  secure the entire welfare gain. 
We now examine the  scenario with imperfect information. If there is free access to 
moneylending, the expected profits will be equal to zero, the expected iso-profits curves, depicted 
in figure 2, will  shift downward  and the fund costs for the lender   will decrease, so that the debtors 
will earn the total gains. 
If the moneylender is a monopolist, and in the presence of exclusive contracts, he will  
secure all the profits generated by the loan activity, unless  the lender  confronts credible threats of 
strategic default from the client. These threats can lead to a  sharing of gains between monopolist 
and borrower. Another important aspect to consider,  concerning the relationships between formal 
and informal sectors, is the possibility for an individual who obtains a loan by an institutional 
agency to relend this amount to another subject,  charging him  a higher interest rate. 
This  possibility is limited by  several factors: 
•  The  supply of funds from institutional agencies is restricted. 
•  The activity of relending implies that the lender has information about the borrower’s 
characteristics, and this type of knowledge is expensive (a part of this costs can be covered 
by the spread between the interest rate applied on the institutional market and the informal 
interest rate). 
•  Alternative activities, such as farming activities, can be more attractive than the “relending” 
and generate higher  returns. 
 
In the case in which there is free entry to the moneylending activity for each potential lender 
able to acquire knowledge concerning the clients, and if there is a sufficiently large number of 
lenders  willing to offer on the market unlimited funds at the interest rate  1 r ,  then the expected 
profits in this sector will decrease in the long run and  fall to zero.   14
   Finally, if there is an excess  demand by potential borrowers at the interest rate  1 r , and the 
institutional agencies are not able to operate exclusively on the market, the equilibrium  will be at 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the underdeveloped countries, informal finance assumes relevant dimensions, as most of 
the population lives in rural zones, in which economic conditions are  difficult. It meets the needs of 
entrepreneurs who have no access to the formal credit market, and can be considered the principal 
indicator of the demand  for microfinance services. The institutions and the organizations that 
operate in the market  for microcredit represent the missing link which ties the formal sector to the 
informal one within the underdeveloped economies.  
An important role is  played by risk, closely connected to farming activities, which turn out 
to be the most important sector in these countries. However, the opportunities for risk management 
(for example, through the provision of insurance) are underdeveloped, especially  in the rural areas. 
What is most surprising is the small proportion of financial transactions that are accounted for by 
the institutional sector, compared to the full scale of market operations, above all in rural 
economies. The aspect that keeps the various financial forms together and dominates this market is 
the reliance on personal ties and economic interdependence among the subjects involved. This 
makes it possible to bypass informational problems that  prevent the formal agencies from finding 
correct information about the debtors, and to effect  a screening activity. 
 
The analysis of the rural markets shows that credit demand is generated by three distinct 
kinds of needs:  fixed capital, mostly to start new economic activities,  working capital, devoted to 
buy equipment used to develop  production, and  consumption credit, generally requested by the 
poor. 
As shown by Basu (1997), the seasonal character of farming production, together with the 
low level of income that characterizes the rural markets, increases the importance of the working 
capital and the  consumption credit; obviously, a lot of resources are necessary to start a farming 
activity, that could be reimbursed only later on, from the moment in which the harvest will be sold.  
The uncertainty that dominates the sector, caused also by outside factors, such as the unforeseeable  
climate conditions, does not allow for reliable forecasts on  future incomes and often creates 
important variations in earnings . 
 
Some peculiar features of the rural credit markets can be readily identified. Above all,   
informational constraints are pervasive: they generate uncertainties concerning the destination of 
the agreed upon loan and the decisions regarding its repayment  because of scarce information   16
about the debtor. Segmentation is another widespread aspect given that credit relations are 
extremely personalized and require time to be set up with the local moneylender. 
Exclusive contracts also play an important role in informal markets ( see Bell, 1990) because 
the lender often does not approve of his client receiving financing from other operators, nurturing 
and favouring monopolistic power in the hands of local moneylenders. The rationing of the 
available credit is another important phenomenon  in such markets, one which affects both the 
formal and informal sector .In my opinion, the most intriguing characteristic that marks rural 
economies is the interlinkage that ties these credit transactions to other types of transactions in 
different markets, like those of labour or land or farm production, with the aim to increase loan 
contract enforcement. 
 
One of the main reasons why credit transactions present interlinkage characteristics is to be 
found in the fact that complex agreements of this type contribute to preventing strategic failure of 
borrowers,  by providing an additional incentive system targeted to loan repayment. 
Basu (1997) describes the hierarchical interdependence that is formed between the landlord and 
tenant, and highlights how this constrains the poor, barring them from free access to credit, tying 
them exclusively to their landlord for all economic needs. 
The same phenomenon of interlinkage is examined through the formal model of Bell (1990), and 
constitutes the main point of my work; this model analytically describes how moneylenders and 
institutional credit agencies interact in the rural Indian credit market. 
 
On the basis of the literature I have examined, I believe that a potential solution for the 
information problems inside these markets is the use of knowledge and information possessed by 
local moneylenders to the benefit of banks and credit institutions. This is possible if we presume 
that those lenders may act on behalf of a formal credit institution, becoming its “agents” to all 
intents and purposes. In such a scenario, agents would operate following the provisions of a 
traditional bank, for which they act as intermediaries, and would at the same time benefit from a 
considerable information potential concerning target customers, such as to allow screening at 
reduced costs, with considerable advantage for the institutional body. 
In case such a suggestion were implemented, the problem of defining a system of incentives, 
to stimulate agents to select the best customers in terms of reliability, would arise; as a possible 
solution, an agent might be guaranteed a fixed minimum salary making the risk affordable, and then 
be given a further variable remuneration linked to the effective repayment rates obtained.   17
APPENDIX 
 
Starting from the assumption that in the presence of the phenomenon of “moral hazard” the 
probability of project default increases with the size of loan (L) (as shown by Bell, 1990), Smith 
(1972, discussed in Milde and Riley, 1988) develops the optimal level of credit rationing, on the 
basis of the contract curve (which describes all the combinations of L and M  Pareto-efficient for 
the lender and the borrower). 
Subsequent elaborations of his model are due to  Jaffee (1972) and Milde and Riley (1988); 
the latter, starting from the analysis of a neoclassic model of credit market, propose a vertical 
contract curve in which a level of fixed L,( )
∗ L , which guarantees the maximization of total surplus, 
is calculated. 
Mathematically, the procedure for the definition of 
∗ L  is simple (figure 1). First, we define 
the feasible set, that is the “constraint”, limited by the curve  ( )
* V Ey = • to the north and by the 
curve that guarantees expected profits equal to zero for the firm to the south. This turns out to be a 
compact set. Then we maximize the total surplus (given by the sum of expected net returns of the 
borrower and expected profits of the lender). 
In order to simplify the analysis, we define such a function in the following way: 
 
( ) ) , ( , r L E r L Ey W π + =     ( a )  
The total surplus (W ) is maximized with the selection of level L that satisfies the first order 






We suppose that the expected profit function is the following: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )L L P L r L P E − − + = 1 1 π    (b) 
Where P represents the probability of success of the project, with ( ) 0 ' < L P . If the project succeeds, 
the return for the lender is the repayment of loan with  interests; in the other case, the return is equal 
to zero. Costs are represented by the loan’s loss in the bad case. 
The slope of the iso-expected profit curve is: 
() ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() L L P




dr ' 1 1 ' 1
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The sign of (c) depends on  
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If  (c) =0 and (d) is satisfied as strict equality, we have an extreme point of the iso-profit curve. We 
now use (c) in order to calculate the second  derivative, with  ( ) 0 ' ' = L P : 
 
() ( ) ( ) [] () () ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) [] () ( ) []
() ()
2 2
2 ' ' 1 1 ' 1 ' 2 1 ' 2
L L P
L P L L P L L P L P L r L P r L P L L P L P r L P
dL
r d + + − − + + + − + +
− =    (e) 
 
The second quadratic bracket is identical to the numerator of  (c), so that its value is zero in the 
neighbourhood of the extreme point (envelope  theorem). 
In this neighbourhood,  (e)>0, then the extreme point is a minimum of the iso-profit curve. We note 
that the value of L which defines this minimum is an inverse function of ( ) r  (see (d)). 
Furthermore, we assume that the expected net income curve is: 
( ) ( ) [ ] rL L y L P Ey − =        (f) 
Where y is the gross return of the project, with  0 '> y  and  0 ' ' < y . If the project succeeds, the 
borrower obtains this amount of money, in the case of default, the returns and the costs are both 
equal to zero
9 (because the borrower does not repay the loan). 
The slope of the indifference curve is: 
()( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]
() L L P












   (g) 
The sign of (g) depends on  
() ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
() r L P
L y L P r L y L P
L
'
' ' + −
≤>     ( h )  
If (g)=0 and (h) is satisfied as strict equality, we have an extreme point; from (g), with  () 0 ' ' = L P : 
 
() () [] () () [] () ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] () () [] [ ]
() ()
2 2
2 ' ' ' " ' ' 2
L L P
r L y L P rL L y L P L P L L P L L P L y L P r L y L P
dL
r d − + − + − + −
=    (i) 
 
The last quadratic bracket is identical to the numerator of (g), and it is equal to zero for the envelope 
theorem. 
If (g)=0,  the two quadratic brackets of (g) must assume the same sign and, in order to have (f)>0, 
this sign must be positive. We now apply this condition at the first quadratic bracket of  (i), and we 
obtain that (i)<0 in the neighbourhood of the extreme point; this point is a maximum of the 
indifference curve. From (h), the value of Lthat defines this maximum is an inverse function of ( ) r . 
                                                 
9 We suppose the absence of  strategic  bankruptcy.   19
 
From (c) and (g) we obtain the equation that defines the contract curve; if we solve forL, we have: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() L P
L y L P L y L P L P
L
' 2
' ' 2 1 − − −
=     ( l )  
Given that  y, y’, P, P ’are only functions of L, the Pareto-efficient level of L  is independent of r, 
therefore the contract curve is vertical. 
In addition to this, we can note that the value of equation (l) is  0 ≥ , only if 
() ( ) ( )
() L y






≥      ( m )  
From (m) it follows that P must be greater than  a certain strictly positive level (not just greater than  
zero).  
If we set (g) equal to zero and solve for L, we obtain the demand function for parametric values of r, 
so  () r D  (figure 1) connects all the maximum points of the indifference curves. 
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